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INTRODUCTION
Since NHK Spring Co. v. Intri-Plex Techs., Inc.1 and more notably,
Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc.,2 the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB” or
“Board”) has been discretionarily denying inter partes review (“IPR”)
petitions with increased frequency under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).3 According to
a February 6, 2022 Report4 by Unified Patents, the PTAB denied institution
on § 314(a) grounds 167 times in 2020 and 123 times in 2021, representing
approximately 43% of petition denials in 2020 and 35% in 2021. These
numbers are notable because in 2018, the year before NHK was decided and
designated precedential, a mere 45 cases were denied on § 314(a) grounds
(and only one in 2017).5 The uptick in § 314(a) denials is undoubtedly the
result of NHK and Fintiv.6
NHK stands for the proposition that the PTAB can consider district
court activities, progression, and deadlines to decide whether instituting IPR
would be “an inefficient use of Board resources” in view of § 314(a).7 Even
though nothing in the statute mentions consideration of parallel litigation
progression in the discretion granted to the USPTO,8 the PTAB has found
persuasive the idea that district court litigation progress impacts whether the
PTAB should institute IPR.9 The Fintiv decision clarified the NHK ruling
and formalized six factors, considered holistically, to evaluate in deciding
whether the PTAB will exercise § 314(a) discretion:
“(1) whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be
granted if a proceeding is instituted; (2) proximity of the court’s trial date
to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; (3)
investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; (4)
overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding;
(5) whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are
the same party; and (6) other circumstances that impact the Board’s
exercise of discretion, including the merits.”10

1. NHK Spring Co. v. Intri-Plex Techs., Inc., No. IPR2018-00752, Paper 8 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 12,
2018) (precedential, designated May 7, 2019).
2. Apple v. Fintiv, Inc., No. IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential,
designated May 5, 2020).
3. “The Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless the Director
determines that the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed
under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect
to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
4. PTAB Procedural Decisions Report: Non-Merits Based Decisions Rise, Denials Fall, UNIFIED
PATENTS (Feb. 6, 2022), https://www.unifiedpatents.com/insights/ptab-procedural-decisions-report
[https://perma.cc/ZS5D-UE3G].
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. NHK Spring Co., Paper 8 at 20 (PTAB Sept. 12, 2018).
8. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
9. See id. (litigation milestones considered include expert discovery ending almost a year before
the IPR oral hearing, and the district court trial starting almost 6 months before the IPR oral hearing).
10. Fintiv, Inc., Paper 11 at 6 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 20, 2020).
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Since Fintiv, a common reason for discretionary denial is that a district
court trial date occurs much earlier than the deadline for a final written
decision from the PTAB.11 These results heed Fintiv’s precedential language
noting that an “earlier” trial date favors discretionary denial.12
As a result of Fintiv, the pendulum swung to the Patent Owner’s favor,
especially when a Patent Owner files a lawsuit in a fast-paced jurisdiction,
such as the Western District of Texas.13 More specifically, Fintiv gave Patent
Owners a valuable tool on procedural grounds to avoid PTAB review of
patent claims under the less stringent “preponderance of the evidence”
burden of proof, and it worked almost 300 times (or 12% of the time) in 2020
and 2021.14
Commentators have not been shy in criticizing Fintiv. Perhaps the
biggest criticism is that Fintiv generally considers trial dates that almost
always change.15 Moreover, not all jurisdictions follow the same scheduling
timeline for a patent infringement lawsuit, meaning that defendants sued in
faster jurisdictions are prejudiced because the Fintiv factors will become
problematic for a petitioner far earlier than the full 12 months allotted by 35
U.S.C. § 315(b).16
However, in late 2020, the pendulum swung back to center after the
petitioner in Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corporation17 successfully
convinced the PTAB that a broad stipulation provided strong weight against
exercising discretion.18 The stipulation stated that “if IPR is instituted,
[Sotera] will not pursue in the District Court Litigation any ground raised or
that could have been reasonably raised in an IPR.”19 The PTAB noted that
the breadth of the stipulation, which essentially matches the language used
in the estoppel statute,20 “weigh[ed] strongly” against an exercise of § 314(a)
11. See, e.g., Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Clear Imaging Res., LLC, IPR2020-01551, Paper 12
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 17, 2021); Verizon Business Network Servs. LLC v. Huawei Techs. Co. Ltd., IPR202001291, Paper 13 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2021).
12. In NHK, “[t]he Board found that the earlier district court trial date presented efficiency
considerations that provided an additional basis, separate from the independent concerns under 35 U.S.C.
§ 325(d),2 for denying institution. Thus, NHK applies to the situation where the district court has set a
trial date to occur earlier than the Board’s deadline to issue a final written decision in an instituted
proceeding.” Fintiv Inc., Paper 11, at 3 (emphasis added).
13. See Pauline Pelletier et. al., How West Texas Patent Trial Speed Affects PTAB Denials, LAW360
(Feb. 16, 2021 4:14 PM EST), https://www.sternekessler.com/news-insights/publications/how-westtexas-patent-trial-speed-affects-ptab-denials [https://perma.cc/4XKX-F97U].
14. UNIFIED PATENTS, supra note 4.
15. Andrew T. Dufresne et. al., How Reliable are Trial Dates Relied on by the PTAB in the Fintiv
Analysis?, 1600 PTAB & BEYOND (Oct. 29, 2021) https://www.1600ptab.com/2021/10/how-reliableare-trial-dates-relied-on-by-the-ptab-in-the-fintiv-analysis/ [https://perma.cc/HF8B-GCQC ] (“Our
results confirm the prior criticism. Out of 55 discretionary denials, only seven cited a trial date that proved
accurate”).
16. See Pelletier, supra note 12.
17. Sotera Wireless, Inc., v. Masimo Corp., No. IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 at 17 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 1,
2020) (precedential, designated Dec. 17, 2020).
18. Id. at 18-19.
19. Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
20. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2).
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discretion.21 Once the decision was designated as precedential, the Sotera
stipulation was born, and petitioners had a low-risk option to help avoid
discretionary denial by effectively advancing the estoppel provision of 35
U.S.C. § 325(e)(2) from Final Written Decision to a Decision Granting
Institution.22
It has been more than a year since Sotera was decided, and so a natural
question is whether the Sotera stipulation has fixed the Fintiv criticisms
described above? Reviewing PTAB decisions in aggregate and the
stipulation language submitted since Sotera will help answer this question.
I. A CLOSER LOOK AT STIPULATION LANGUAGE
The Sotera decision built on an earlier decision: Sand Revolution II,
LLC v. Cont’l Intermodal Group – Trucking LLC.23 In Sand Revolution, the
petitioner filed a narrow stipulation stating, “if the IPR is instituted,
Petitioner will not pursue the same grounds in the district court litigation.”24
The Board gave this stipulation only “marginal” weight against exercising
314(a) discretion due to the stipulation’s narrow breadth.25 In contrast, the
Board found that a Sotera stipulation provides strong weight against
discretionary denial.26 But are there any workable stipulations that fall
between a Sotera stipulation and a Sand Revolution stipulation?
Apparently not. In the 14 months after Sotera, stipulation language
varied, sometimes notably, as clever practitioners attempted to avoid
discretionary denial without “giving away the farm”27 by submitting a Sotera
stipulation. Despite the variety in stipulation language proposed by differing
petitioners, the PTAB has taken a binary approach in classifying the various
stipulations reviewed and considered since Sotera, dividing stipulations into
one of two buckets. The first bucket falls into the true Sotera category, and
such stipulations always include the “or could have been reasonably raised”

21. Sotera, Paper 12 at 19.
22. Nathan Sportel, PTAB’s Fintiv Test and the Use of Stipulations in Parallel District Court
Litigation, 27 IP LITIGATOR 8-11 (MAY/JUNE 2021).
23. IPR2019-01393, Paper 24 at 7 (PTAB June 16, 2020) (informative).
24. Id. at 11-12.
25. Id. at 12.
26. Sotera, IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 at 17.
27. It should be noted here that a Sotera stipulation will never include ineligible prior art for IPR,
such as product prior art, evidence of a prior sale, public use, etc. Philip Morris Products SA v. RAI
Strategic Holdings, Inc., IPR2020-01094, Paper 9 at 21-23 (PTAB January 25, 2021); 35 U.S.C. § 311(b).
Certainly, a Sotera stipulation is more attractive if a defendant has invalidity arguments using prior art
that is not a patent or a printed publication. Nevertheless, a Sotera stipulation is an attractive option when
facing a Fintiv challenge because, as Scott McKeown has noted, a petitioner’s best chance of invalidating
an asserted patent remains at the PTAB. Scott McKeown, Top 5 PTAB Developments of 2020 for District
Court Litigators, ROPES AND GRAY (Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.patentspostgrant.com/top-5-ptabdevelopments-for-district-court-litigators/. So, a Sotera stipulation likely never “gives away the farm,”
even though some practitioners may feel hesitant about submitting one.
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language.28 All other stipulations fall into the Sand Revolution bucket, which
merely receives “marginal” or “slight” weight against exercising discretion
under § 314(a).29
Petitioners have tested the boundaries of the Sotera stipulation by
writing stipulations that track the stipulation in Sotera but lack the magic
words “or reasonably could have raised.” For example, in Apple Inc. v. Koss
Corporation,30 the petitioner offered a stipulation on the petitioned grounds
and any other grounds using the same primary reference used in the
petition.31 The PTAB recognized that this stipulation was broader than the
stipulation in Sand Revolution, but the PTAB still treated this stipulation like
a Sand Revolution stipulation, giving it only marginal weight against
discretionary denial.32 Similar stipulations have been made by petitioners,
vowing not to assert any of the references cited in the petition, regardless of
primary, secondary, or otherwise, in the parallel litigation, but this attempt,
like the Apple v. Koss stipulation, has failed to receive anything more than
“marginal” weight.33
While there have been some clever attempts to receive more than
marginal weight against discretionary denial, no stipulation that lacked the
“or that could have been reasonably raised” language has been given
anything other than “marginal” or “slight” weight against discretion. And
often, this marginal weight has not been enough to overcome concerns
regarding district court litigation.34
As we see from these cases, after fourteen months of Sotera precedent,
the Board has confirmed that nothing short of a true Sotera stipulation,
having the “or that could have been reasonably raised” language, will
receive anything more than “marginal weight” against exercising § 314
discretion. Whether that marginal weight is enough to survive a Fintiv
challenge depends on other facts, as applied by the Board through the other
five Fintiv factors. Still, practitioners should be aware that clever attempts to
file broader stipulations lacking the magic Sotera language likely will not
receive any more weight than a basic Sand Revolution stipulation limited to
only the petition grounds. From the Board’s perspective, a stipulation is
either Sotera or Sand Revolution; apparently, there is nothing of significance
28. Medtronic CoreValve LLC v. Colibri Heart Valve LLC, IPR2020-01454, Paper 11 at 16-17
(PTAB March 10, 2021).
29. Compare Tennant Company v. Oxygenator Water Technologies, Inc., IPR2021-00625, Paper 9
at 16 (PTAB August 20, 2021) with Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Wsou Investments, LLC, IPR2021-00538,
Paper 9 at 13-16 (PTAB August 18, 2021).
30. IPR2021-00255, Paper 22 at 16 (PTAB June 3, 2021).
31. Id. at 18.
32. Id. at 19.
33. See, e.g. Canon Inc. v. Optimum Imaging Techs. LLC, No. IPR2020-01321, Paper 10 at 10-11
(P.T.A.B. Mar. 1, 2021).
34. See, e.g. SharkNinja Operating LLC v. iRobot Corp., No. IPR2021-00544, Paper 13 (P.T.A.B.
Nov. 17, 2021); LG Elecs., Inc. v. Ancora Techs., Inc., No. IPR2021-00581, Paper 16 (P.T.A.B. June 10,
2021); Google LLC v. EcoFactor Inc., No. IPR2021-00454, Paper 9 (P.T.A.B. July 22, 2021).
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therebetween. Thus, whether stipulations solve the Fintiv criticism hinges on
whether the petitioner uses precise Sotera stipulation language.
II. A CLOSER LOOK AT THE NUMBERS
As mentioned above, a true Sotera stipulation provides much stronger
protection against discretionary denial than a Sand Revolution stipulation.
Knowing this, one would think that Petitioners would file Sotera stipulations
with regularity. However, the numbers suggest that petitioners opted for a
Sotera stipulation only about 50% of the time.
211 institution decisions citing to Sotera, from December 2020 through
February 2022, were analyzed for the purpose of writing this article. As a
result of this analysis, it was found that 106 petitioners opted for a Sotera
stipulation while 105 petitioners opted for a Sand Revolution stipulation.
Over time, however, Sotera stipulations have become more frequent.35
That is not to say that the PTAB never institutes inter partes review
when a Petitioner provides a Sand Revolution stipulation. In fact, the PTAB
has found that a Sand Revolution stipulation can overcome some trial date
concerns, even a trial date scheduled for three months before the due date for
the Final Written Decision.36 Also, numerous petitions have been granted
when the Petitioner provides a Sand Revolution stipulation, although the
other facts, including the trial date, typically did not weigh strongly against
institution in those cases.37 But of course, several instances show that Sand
Revolution stipulations will not suffice when there are significant trial date
concerns.38
On the other hand, a Sotera stipulation is not bulletproof.39 In Cisco
Systems, Inc. v. Estech Systems, Inc.,40 a Sotera stipulation was not sufficient
to overcome a trial date scheduled for 11 months before the due date of a
Final Written Decision and the completion of fact and expert discovery in
the parallel litigation.41 In other words, a Sotera stipulation could not
overcome strong denial weight under both Fintiv factors (2) and (3).
So, whether a petition needs a Sand Revolution or a Sotera stipulation
will depend on the other facts of the case. Petitioners are generally cognizant
of their set of circumstances and how the Board is likely to react to that
particular set of facts. And it is certainly worth noting that, even after the

35. Trend discovered because the researcher reviewed institution decisions in chronological order.
36. Facebook, Inc. v. Onstream Media Corp., No. IPR2020-01527, Paper 11 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 5,
2021).
37. Western Digital Corp. v. Kuster, No. IPR2020-01410, Paper 13 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 17, 2021);
Netapp, Inc. v. Proven Networks, LLC, No. IPR2020-01436, Paper 11 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 9, 2021).
38. Canon Inc., Paper 10 at 10-11 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 1, 2021)..
39. See Tianma Micro-electronics Co., Ltd. v. Japan Display Inc, No. IPR2021-01057, Paper 15
(P.T.A.B. Jan. 6, 2022) (“Sotera-type stipulations are not always dispositive of institution”)
40. Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Estech Sys., Inc., No. IPR2021-00329, Paper 13 (P.T.A.B. July 6, 2021).
41. Id. at 13.
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Board’s guidance in Sotera, the Board still appreciates and gives some
favorable weight against discretionary denial to non-Sotera stipulations.42
III. HAS SOTERA SOLVED THE FINTIV CRITICISMS?
While Sotera gives the petitioner some control against discretionary
denial, Sotera has by no means “fixed” Fintiv. The Board still considers trial
dates and scheduling orders that may change,43 there is no movement toward
uniformity in patent litigation scheduling nationwide, and Sotera
stipulations, by the Board’s own admission, are “not always dispositive.”44
Moreover, it does not appear that Fintiv is going away anytime soon,
especially considering that the Administration Procedure Act challenge to
Fintiv in the Northern District of California was dismissed,45 and Congress
has not passed the “Restoring America Invents Act” Bill introduced by
Senator Patrick Leahy in September 2021, directed at overruling Fintiv
through legislation.46
Regardless, whether you like or loathe Fintiv, the PTAB’s discretionary
denials precedent has certainly become increasingly complex since the
inception of IPR in 2012, particularly in the way that the PTAB has
interpreted § 314(a). The same can be said of § 325(d) precedent, which has
its own multi-prong test47 to potentially consider. Unfortunately, the PTAB,
in an effort to clarify discretionary denial, has made matters much more
complicated. Petitioners in many, if not most, situations must provide indepth, substantive arguments addressing numerous discretionary denial
factors.48 These arguments require significant space in a petition only
allowed to have 14,000 words.49 The words used to address discretionary
denials deduct from words that could be used to discuss the merits of the
petition, which is the entire point of an inter partes review – to determine
whether a patent should have been granted in view of the prior art.50 As a
42. Quest Diagnostics Inc. v. Ravgen, Inc., No. IPR2021-00788, Paper 23 at 35 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 19,
2021) (“the Board has not mandated that a stipulation must be as broad as the one in Sotera Wireless or
cover the same scope as the estoppel provisions of § 315(e) in order to be considered in a Fintiv
analysis.”).
43. Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Proxense, LLC, No. IPR2021-01439, Paper 11 at 6-15
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 28, 2022).
44. Tianma, Paper 15.
45. Apple Inc. v. Iancu, No. 5:20-CV-06128-EJD, 2021 WL 5232241 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2021).
46. Press Release, Sen. Patrick Leahy, Leahy and Cornyn Introduce Bipartisan Bill to Support
American Innovation And Reduce Litigation (Sept. 29, 2021), https://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/leahyand-cornyn-introduce-bipartisan-bill-to-support-american-innovation-and-reduce-litigation
[https://perma.cc/92SW-QBNB].
47. Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. B. Braun Melsungen AG, No. IPR2017-01586, Paper 8 (P.T.A.B.
Dec. 15, 2017).
48. Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Novartis Pharma Ag, No. IPR2020-01317, Paper 12, at 6
(P.T.A.B. Nov. 17, 2020) (the Fintiv factors “are expected to be addressed in some manner in the petition
when it is reasonably foreseeable that patent owner may raise these issues.”).
49. 37 C.F.R. § 42.24(a)(1)(i) (2021).
50. H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, p. 39, 164 (June 1, 2011) (Conf. Rep.)
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result, petitioners may forego drafting an important backup position, arguing
additional motivations to combine, or challenging some claims to ensure that
strong arguments against discretionary denial are presented in the petition.
The more complicated the PTAB makes discretionary jurisprudence, the less
petitioners, patent owners, and the Board itself get to focus on the substance
of the petition.
Nevertheless, the USPTO can self-correct. An alternative solution
would be to set a separate word count limit for arguments directed to
discretionary denial under any of the discretion statutes. A separate word
count applying to discretion arguments would not affect or take away from
arguments directed to the substance of the IPR – namely the grounds for
unpatentability. Such a rule change would not be controversial, as the PTAB
has, in some situations, allowed additional briefing on Fintiv, but those
situations were usually limited to petitions filed before Fintiv was decided.51
The 14,000-word limit has been in effect since the USPTO changed the
rule in 2016 from 60 pages to 14,000 words.52 Notably, none of NHK, Fintiv,
or Becton, Dickinson were decided under the current 14,000-word limit. The
word limit was set before anyone knew how complex the PTAB would make
their interpretation of §§ 314(a) and 325(d). Now that PTAB has determined
how it will interpret these statutes, and particularly that the interpretation
considers numerous factors, the USPTO should reconsider the petition word
limit, and set a separate word limit for arguments directed to discretionary
denial.
Certainly, Sotera alleviated some fears about just how broadly the
Board would apply Fintiv, but the holding of Sotera won’t change how
complicated matters have become when it comes to applying and analyzing
§§ 314(a) and 325(d). Other impacts should be analyzed, and a
reconsideration of the current word limits would go far in mitigating the
impact of our modern discretionary denial landscape.

51. Sotera, Papers 10-11.
52. See 81 Fed. Reg. 18,750 (Apr. 1, 2016).

